HENRY KISSINGER, SOEHARTO DAN TIMUR LESTE

Memang benar bahwa Presiden Amerika Serikat Gerald Ford dan Menteri Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat Henry Kissinger telah mengizinkan serangan Indonesia terhadap wilayah Timor Portugis. Lampu hijau tersebut diberikan saat mereka bertemu dengan Presiden Soeharto dan Menteri Luar Negeri Adam Malik pada tanggal 6 Desember 1975 di Jakarta (foto bawah).

Isi dari pertemuan tersebut, yang sebelumnya tergolong rahasia, pertama kali dibongkar pada tahun 2001 oleh peneliti di Universitas George Washington. Dari beberapa dokumen yang diperoleh dari Perpustakaan Kepresidenan Gerald R. Ford, ada Telegram Kedutaan Besar Amerika Serikat di Jakarta No. 1579 yang melampirkan transkripsi pertemuan antara petinggi-petinggi Amerika Serikat dan Indonesia.

Agar tidak ada kesalahan dalam penerjemahan, saya salin bagian bahasa Inggris asli yang relevan dari telegram tersebut:

39. [Suharto –] I would like to speak to you, Mr President, about another problem, Timor. When it looked as if the Portuguese rule would end in Timor we sought to encourage the Portuguese to an orderly decolonization process. We had agreement with them on such a process and we recognized the authority of Portugal in the carrying out of decolonization and in giving people the right to express their wishes. Indonesia has no territorial ambitions. We are concerned only about the security, tranquility and peace of Asia and the southern hemisphere. In the latest Rome agreement the Portuguese government wanted to invite all parties to negotiate. Similar efforts were made before but Fretilin did not attend. After the Fretilin forces occupied certain points and other forces were unable consolidate, Fretilin has declared its independence unilaterally. In consequence other parties declared their intention of integrating with Indonesia. Portugal reported the situation to the United Nations but did not extend recognition to Fretilin. Portugal, however, is unable to control the situation. If this continues it will prolong the suffering of the refugees and increase the instability in the area.

40. Ford – The four other parties have asked for integration?

41. Suharto – Yes. After the UDT, Indonesia found itself facing a fait accompli. It is now important to determine what we can do to establish peace and order for the present and the future in the interest of the security of the area and Indonesia. These are some of the considerations we are now contemplating. We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.

42. Ford – We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have.

43. Kissinger – You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems.

44. Ford – We could have technical and legal problems. You are familiar, Mr President, with the problems we had on Cyprus although this situation is different.

45. Kissinger – It depends on how we construe it: whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way. The President will be back on Monday at 2:00 PM Jakarta time. We understand your problem and the need to move quickly but I am only saying that it would be better if it were done after we returned.

46. Ford – It would be more authoritative if we can do it in person.

47. Kissinger – Whatever you do, however, we will try to handle in the best way possible.

48. Ford – We recognize that you have a time factor. We have merely expressed our view from our particular point of view.

49. Kissinger – If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home.

50. [Kissinger –] Do you anticipate a long guerrilla war there?

51. Suharto – There will probably be a small guerrilla war. The local kings are important, however, and they are on our side. The UDT represents former government officials and Fretilin represents former soldiers. They are infected the same as is the Portuguese army with communism.

Seperti yang diungkap oleh Kissinger di baris ke-45, Amerika Serikat berharap aksi militer terhadap Timor Portugis bisa diselesaikan secepatnya karena akan lebih mudah bagi mereka untuk “menjelaskan” mengapa serangan terjadi.

Harus diingat bahwa beberapa bulan sebelum pertemuan antara para petinggi tersebut, Amerika Serikat secara resmi mengundurkan diri dari Perang Vietnam. Mereka tidak ingin terlibat pada konflik panjang seperti itu lagi, apalagi karena Indonesia menyatakan bahwa Fretilin bersifat komunis. (Layak diketahui bahwa Fretilin memang berada di sayap kiri, namun sebenarnya mereka bukan partai komunis.)